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Sex and (sexed by) the State 
Taylor Flynn * 
I've been thinking about sex a lot lately -
having sex, being sexed, sex in marriage, sex in 
other legal regimes - and I keep coming back 
to one thing: that despite the contingency of a 
person's legal sex, the law treats sex as the sine 
qua non for major life events such as marriage 
and parenthood. 
As Ms. Tran was discussing, the law not 
only tries to discipline the body into traditional 
sex roles, but it also has the power to declare 
you to be a particular legal sex, even over your 
objection. The majority of jurisdictions follow 
the orthodoxy of sex as "genitalia-at-birth." 
Under this view, a male to female transgender 
woman (who, for example, has undergone sur-
gery and is anatomically indistinguishable from 
someone born with female genitalia) is deemed 
in the majority of states to be legally male. In a 
handful of more progressive states, the law 
looks predominantly - although unfortunately, 
not exclusively - at an individual's gender iden-
tity to determine legal sex. As a result of these 
differing legal approaches, a person can be le-
gally male in one state and female in another. 
Thus, the law (at least cross-jurisdictionally) ac-
knowledges the fluidity of sex, yet it makes cen-
tral life decisions tum on what sex you are. 
*Professor Taylor Flynn joined the Northeastern 
community in 2003 after serving on the faculty of Western 
New England College School of Law. Prior to joining the 
academic community on a full-time basis, Professor Flynn 
was a staff attorney with the ACLU of Southern California. 
Her area of specialization, both at the ACLU and in her 
academic research, focuses on discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity. 
At the ACLU, Professor Flynn litigated a wide array of 
issues. She argued before the California Supreme Court on 
behalf of three boys who had been expelled from the Boy 
Scouts based on their sexual orientation and religious non-
I said I was also thinking about having sex 
- how you have it and with whom. The law's 
regulation of sexual activity is inextricably 
bound with the law's determination of your le-
gal sex and whether you can marry. In New 
Jersey, for instance, there is a case that was rev-
olutionary at the time it was decided, in the 
1970s. The court recognized a trans gender wo-
man who had been born anatomically male as 
legally female. In doing so, however, the court 
did two things. First, the court used what I like 
to call a "body parts checklist": the court 
looked at her body and compared it to a pre-
sumed female norm, checking off the list and 
making sure that everything matched up right. 
The court remarked, for example, that the wo-
man's vagina "has a good cosmetic appearance" 
and that "[h]er vagina could function as any 
normal female vagina." How, you may ask, 
does any "normal" female vagina function? 
"For traditional penile/vaginal intercourse," the 
court tells us. 
Why is this important for the courts? Peo-
ple may be surprised to learn that in most states 
you can still annul a marriage due to "physical 
incapacity" - for a couple's failure to have het-
erosexual intercourse. I litigated a transgender 
marriage case where this was one of the claims: 
belief, and she served as co-counsel in a successful Ninth 
Circuit challenge to the Los Angeles Police Department's 
practice of continuing to question criminal suspects after they 
had invoked their Miranda rights. In a decision thought to 
be the first of its kind, she secured a victory on behalf of a 
transgendered father who faced losing all legal rights to his 
child solely because of his gender identity. 
Professor Flynn's scholarly work has appeared in the 
Columbia Law Review, Stanford Law and Policy Review and 
the Iowa Law Review. She teaches Constitutional Law, First 
Amendment and Trusts and Estates. 
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that the marriage was invalid on the ground 
that the trans husband did not have a penis 
deemed sufficiently functional to have inter-
course. While you should be able to say, partic-
ularly after Lawrence v. Texas, that this is a vio-
lation of your right to privacy, we still had to go 
through a three-week trial on this issue. 
And so even in a progressive state like 
New Jersey, you've got an exaltation of male 
penetration of women that has the effect of 
turning wives into little more than the recepta-
cles for sex and marriage into the missionary 
position. 
What I would like to do briefly, because I 
see my time is running short, is to discuss Good-
ridge v. Department of Public Health, the Mas-
sachusetts same-sex marriage case. I fully agree 
with Nancy Polikoff - I would love to see the 
legal (as opposed to cultural or religious) insti-
tution of marriage dismantled as the primary 
method of distributing benefits. But in some 
ways, I think that the "radical right" might be 
correct when they say that same-sex marriage is 
going to "destroy" traditional marriage. My 
hope, at least, is that they are right, but not for 
the same reasons and not on the same timeta-
ble. 
(Laughter.) 
For trans people, Goodridge does away 
with a possible challenge to the validity of their 
marriage because the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court struck down the sex requirement. 
My hope and belief is that this will in some 
ways "destroy" the highly gendered and sexist 
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aspects that have long been central to tradi-
tional marriage. Over the centuries, because I 
think that's how long it will take, having two 
men or two women or people of undetermined 
sex( es) in marriage will loosen up the concep-
tion of what it means to be a husband or a wife 
or a spouse, or who gets to parent their chil-
dren. 
I also would like to address some of the is-
sues that Nancy Polikoff was discussing, the pri-
mary one being the exaltation of marriage and 
the assimilationist focus in the case. One cri-
tique of Goodridge, an important one, is that le-
galizing same-sex marriage will turn people into 
the "good gays" and the "bad gays," or the 
"good" and "bad" transgender people - those 
who get married and those who do not. In fact, 
the Goodridge court says that it may be accept-
able to remove protections for nonmarital fami-
lies because same-sex couples now have the op-
tion of getting married. I think this is extremely 
worrisome. But in my last minute of time re-
maining, I would like to discuss what I think is 
the most positive aspect of the case. Marriage 
has been used historically as a tool of subordi-
nation by denying certain groups access to 
norms, whether that group consists of Chinese 
laborers or slaves or interracial couples. While 
marriage still serves as a denial of access to 
many, the move toward demolishing this partic-
ular state-sponsored mechanism of control over 
who is allowed "in" and who remains "out" is 
an extraordinarily significant achievement. 
Thank you. 
